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MILLER VERSUS TEXAS: POLICE VIOLENCE,
RACE RELATIONS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
AND GUN-TOTING IN TEXAS IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY - AND TODAY
Cynthia Leonardatos*
David B. Kopel**
Stephen P Halbrook***
INTRODUCTION
Does the Second Amendment's protection of the right to keep
and bear arms provide protection against state gun laws or only
against federal gun laws? Should courts aggressively use the
Fourteenth Amendment as a tool against racially biased big-city
police departments that allegedly use excessive force? Can a man
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who claims that he shot a police officer in self-defense get a fair
trial in Texas, and is the Texas death penalty system biased against
defendants? These issues are very much in the news as the
American legal system enters the twenty-first century. It was not
very long ago that the fortuitous presence of a camcorder proved
that Rodney King had been illegally assaulted by the police. From
New York City to Los Angeles, and very many places in between,
charges of excessive and racist police violence are widespread.'
Yet as modem as these issues are, they are not brand new. Indeed,
they were the subject of a U.S. Supreme Court case in 1894: Miller
v. Texas.2
In this article, we examine Miller to see how far the American
and Texas criminal justice systems have, or have not, evolved since
1894 in the context of a highly-publicized shooting of a police
officer in alleged self-defense. Today's American legal community
tends to think of itself as vastly more enlightened than it was in the
bad old days of the 1890s, but we suggest that things have not
progressed quite as far as the American legal community might
claim.
Additionally, we examine Miller v. Texas' implications for
firearms law doctrine. In determining whether the Fourteenth
Amendment extends the reach of the Second Amendment against
state law, courts have reached all the way back to an 1886 case,
Presser v. Illinois,3 claiming that the Second Amendment is not
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Such a stretch by
the courts is unusual in itself, since modem Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation doctrine does not tend to find that cases from before
'E.g., David B. Kopel, Police Violence in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VIOLENCE IN
THE UNITED STATES (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1999).
2 Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
4 See, e.g., Fresno Rifle Club v. Van de Kamp, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992)
(upholding California's Assault Weapons Control Act); Quilici v. Vill. of Morton
Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding handgun ban), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); see also Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. City of
Columbus, 152 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 1998) (invalidating city's "assault weapon"
ban as vague and violative of equal protection, but stating in dictum that Presser
held that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states).
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the 1920s create binding precedent. 5 Presser, a case upholding the
State of Illinois' authority to suppress armed public parades,
contained dicta upon which the anti-incorporation argument is
founded. We briefly look at Presser to illustrate that this Second
Amendment anti-incorporation foundation is ambiguous and
opaque. We then turn to Miller v. Texas that came a decade later
and addressed the incorporation of the Second, Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.6 According to Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation of these amendments was still unresolved. 7 There-
fore, Miller suggests that Presser did not definitively rule out
incorporation of the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I. FRANKLIN MILLER'S STORY
A. Miller and a Black Woman Live Together
Franklin P. Miller was bom in Virginia in 1855.8 As the son
of a successful planter, 9 he was fortunate enough to have received
5 E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967).
6 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
' The issue would remain unresolved in the Miller decision, since Mr.
Miller had failed to raise the issues below. See infra, note 135 and accompanying
text.
8 Convict Record Ledger Data Transcription Form-Later Records, July 18,
1895, reproduced from, The Holdings of the Texas State Archives [hereinafter
Convict Record Ledger Data] (on file with authors). According to Bill Simmons,
Archival Services Staff, Archives and Information Services Division, Texas State
Archives, there are two sets of ledgers which contain personal information about
the convicts in the Texas state prison system: the convict record ledgers and the
conduct registers. Letter from Bill Simmons, Archival Staff Member, Texas State
Library and Archives Commission, to Cynthia Leonardatos (Nov. 18, 1999) (on
file with authors). With regards to the physical description of Franklin P. Miller,
the following information was recorded in these ledgers: Miller was 5'8" and
weighed 149 pounds. He had blue eyes, dark hair, and a fair complexion. He had
a scar on his left shin and a boil scar on the small of his back. Miller was a non-
smoker, and he wore a size ten shoe. Id.
9 A Fearful Deed, DAL. MORN. NEWS, June 18, 1892, at 1.
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ten years of formal education and was proficient in reading and
writing. 0 When he was twenty-five years old, he moved to Waco,
Texas and married a woman whose name he later forgot.' Miller
and his bride had been married for only three weeks when he
decided to leave her after realizing that they could not live
together. After spending some time in Indian territory, Miller
returned to Texas in 1890 and established a home and a shoe-
making business in Dallas.'3 His residence and shop occupied
three rooms of a house that he shared with a Mrs. Perkins and her
blind son. 4
About a year after returning to Texas, Miller hired Mattie
Anderson, a twenty-four year old "negress" to wash and cook for
him in exchange for a monthly stipend and room and board for
herself and her two-year-old mulatto daughter.' 5 Anderson was
separated from her husband, Harry Anderson, a black man who
lived in the eastern section of Dallas County.'6 Notwithstanding
the suspicions of certain townspeople, both Anderson and Miller
denied that Miller was the father of her daughter."' They insisted
that their relationship was entirely a professional one.'8
'0 Convict Record Ledger Data, supra note 8, at 1.
A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
12 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
'3 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
14 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1. Regarding this agreement, the
newspaper articles differ as to the amount of money Miller paid Anderson each
month. According to an article written in the Galveston Daily News, Miller paid
Anderson $10 a month. Blood in Dallas, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, June 18,
1892, at 1. On the other hand, the Dallas Morning News reported that Miller
paid Anderson $1 a month. A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
16 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
17 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
IS A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1; see also Blood in Dallas, GALVESTON
DAILY NEWS, June 18, 1892, at 1; Foul Murder - A Desperado Fires Upon Two
Officers, DAL. DAILY TIMES-HERALD, June 17, 1892, at 1, 5 (describing
Anderson as a "young and greasy-looking negress ... a black and ugly wench
of 30 years ... a sharp and rather shrewd creature").
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B. Miller's Arrest and His Relationship with the Police
In early 1892, Miller was arrested by Dallas Police Officers
Lamar and Estelle on charges relating to the fact that Miller and
Anderson were living together.19 The reporters who covered the
Miller/Anderson saga failed to include any information as to
whether the officers had probable cause for this arrest or if they
were improperly motivated by racial animus. It is not difficult to
surmise that the white Dallas County police officers may have
disliked Miller simply because he was openly living with a black
woman and her light-skinned child, whom they probably thought
was Miller's daughter. In the late nineteenth century, sexual
relations between whites and blacks were strongly discouraged,
especially if a child resulted from the union.20 Notably, while the
19 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1; Blood in Dallas, supra note 15, at 1;
Foul Murder - A Desperado Fires Upon Two Officers, supra note 18, at 1.
According to the latter article, Miller was arrested for adultery. See 1879 TEX.
PENAL CODE 333-336. The 1879 Texas adultery statute provided:
Adultery is the living together and carnal intercourse with each other,
or habitual camal intercourse with each other, without living together,
of a man and woman when either is lawfully married to some other
person. The proof of marriage in such cases may be made by the
production of the original marriage license and return thereon, or a
certified copy thereof, or by the testimony of any person who was
present at such marriage, or who has known the husband and wife to
live together as married persons. When the offense of adultery has
been committed, both parties are guilty, although only one of them
may be married. Every person guilty of adultery shall be punished by
fine not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.
Id. Unfortunately, the news articles do not contain information as to the reason
why the officers failed to arrest Mattie Anderson along with Miller if they were
both guilty of adultery. There is also no information to indicate what evidence
the officers had to prove that Miller or Anderson committed adultery. It is quite
possible, on the other hand, that the officers mistakenly arrested Miller for
violating Texas' fornication statute which defined such behavior as "the living
together and carnal intercourse with each other or habitual carnal intercourse with
each other without living together, of a man and woman, both being unmarried."
Id.
20 See PHILIP PERLMUTTER, DIVIDED WE FALL 47 (1992) ("For Whites in
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Texas adultery and fornication statutes were punishable only by a
fine, the miscegenation law carried a prison term.21 If the officers
could imprison Mr. Miller for a few years for violating this statute,
Mrs. Anderson would probably be forced to leave the county in
shame to seek work elsewhere. Her prospects would have been
bleak.2'
It seems extremely improbable that Miller was the only single
white male living in Dallas who employed a black single mother
as a live-in domestic servant. It is therefore reasonable to infer that
the police had some reason (not necessarily a good reason) for
believing that the Miller/Anderson relationship had a sexual
component.
America, Black-White sexual relations were most opposed."); id. at 74 (detailing
legislation passed by states imposing fines, banishment or whippings for the
crime of "'fornication with a Negro man or women'"); RONALD TAKAKI, A
DIFFERENT MIRROR 109 (1993) ("Everywhere, white social sentiment abhorred
white and black relationships."). Like many other Southern states at the time,
Texas had a miscegenation statute which punished blacks and whites who
intermarried or who married outside the state but who lived in Texas as man and
wife. Violation of the law resulted in two to five years in the penitentiary. 1879
TEX. PENAL CODE 326.
Legal restraints on miscegenation date from early colonial Virginia where,
for example, Hugh Davis was "to be soundly whipped before an assembly of
Negroes and others for abusing himself to the dishonor of God and shame of
Christians by defiling his body in lying with a Negro; which fault he is to
acknowledge next Sabbath day." Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virgin-
ia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189,
1191 (1969).
2 1879 TEX. PENAL CODE 326.
22 TAKAKI, supra note 20, at 138.
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the possibility of
progress for blacks was distressingly remote. Racial borders had been
reinforced by class and caste . . .During the 1890's, new laws
buttressed segregation by defining more precisely the "Negro's place"
on trains and streetcars and in schools, parks, theaters, hotels, and
hospitals . . .Poll taxes and literacy requirements for suffrage were
effectively disfranchising blacks, and hundreds of blacks were annually
being lynched. This era was brutally repressive.
TAKAKI, supra note 20, at 138.
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Miller was unhappy about his brush with the law and he
publicly threatened the officers in the months following his
arrest.13 Miller claimed that several people had informed him of
threats against his life, including "a young gambler with a light
mustache," and three Negroes who told him "to look out and be on
my guard; that the officers were after me because I had that negro
woman cooking and staying with me." 24 Miller, while holding
Anderson's daughter, was heard by several people to say, "I will
kill the first s- of a b- of a policeman that attempts to arrest
me. 25 Miller was seen brandishing his pistol in front of his
business on the same day he made this threat.26 He owned a .38
caliber Smith & Wesson revolver and, after expecting trouble with
the officers, he purchased a Colt .45 revolver as well.27 A week
later, Miller ended up in a gun battle with the police.
C. Texas Fireanns Laws
According to the 1876 Texas Constitution: "Every citizen shall
have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of
himself or the state; but the Legislature shall have the power by
law to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent
,,28 17crime. The 1875 Constitutional Convention in Texas, which
adopted this provision, gave the Legislature the power to regulate
the "wearing of arms., 29 Any statutory regulation, however, must
be enacted "with a view to prevent crime."3°
After learning of Miller's statements about resisting any future
arrest, Officers Lamar and Estelle obtained an affidavit charging
23 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
24 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
25 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
26 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
27 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1. Newspaper accounts of the story do
not include any information as to why Miller expected an escalation of the
conflict between him and the officers.
28 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1876).
29 Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in Texas: The Intent of the
Framers of the Bill of Rights, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 629, 666-67 (1989).
30 TEx. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1876).
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Miller with carrying weapons, 31 cursing, and swearing.32 Regard-
ing the weapons charge, Miller was arrested for violating a statute
entitled, "An Act to Regulate the Keeping and Bearing of Deadly
Weapons," which read in pertinent part:
Any person carrying on or about his person ... any pistol
... for the purpose of offense or defense, unless he has
reasonable grounds for fearing an unlawful attack on his
person, and that such ground of attack shall be immediate
and pressing ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ...
Provided, that this section shall not be so construed as to
prohibit any person from keeping or having arms on his or
her own premises or place of business.33
Section 2 of the Act provided that a person asserting that he carried
arms because he was in danger of attack,
shall be required to show that such danger was immediate
and pressing, and was of such a nature as to alarm a
person of ordinary courage; and that the arms so carried
were borne openly, and not concealed beneath the clothing;
and if it shall appear that this danger had its origin in a
31 See An Act to Regulate the Keeping and Bearing of Deadly Weapons Law
of April 12, 1871, ch. 34, § 1, 1871 TEX. GEN. LAWS 25; 6 H.P.N. GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TEXAS 927 (1898). Miller must have been arrested for violating this
statute because he challenged the legality of this law in a motion for rehearing
after his conviction had been affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 536 (1894).
32 Id.; see 1879 TEX. PENAL CODE 314.
If any person shall go into any public place, or into or near any private
house, or along any public street or highway near any private house,
and shall use loud and vociferous or obscene, vulgar or indecent
language, or swear, or curse, or expose his person, or rudely display
any pistol or other deadly weapon in such public place, or upon such
public street or highway, or near such private house, in a manner
calculated to disturb the inhabitants thereof, he shall be fined in a sum
not exceeding one hundred dollars.
Id.
" An Act to Regulate the Keeping and Bearing of Deadly Weapons Law of
April 12, 1871, ch. 34, § 1, 1871 TEX. GEN. LAWS 25.
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difficulty first commenced by the accused, it shall not be
considered a legal defense.34
Violators of this law were subject to punishment by a fine of
not less than $25 nor more than $100 and a forfeiture of the weap-
on.35 The Act allowed state officials to arrest a suspect without a
warrant.36 The Texas state courts, when interpreting this act, relied
on the precedent set by State v. Duke37 in which the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that the federal Second Amendment did not
38limit state action.
D. Miller's Second Arrest, and the Shoot-out
Dallas Police Officers Lamar and Estelle gave their affidavit to
Officer Riddle and Officer Early to serve on Miller. Officers
Riddle and Early went to his shop on the evening of Thursday,
June 16, 1892, but departed after finding the business closed.4 °
The officers returned to the shop the next morning at approximate-
ly eleven o'clock.4'
In newspaper interviews, Franklin Miller, Mattie Anderson, a
bystander, and Officer Early each offered different accounts of the
attempted arrest and subsequent shooting in the shoemaking shop
on the morning of June 18, 1892.
1. Franklin Miller's Version
During an interview with a reporter while he was in prison,
Miller gave a somewhat improbable version of the events leading
up to the shooting of Officer Riddle.42 Miller stated that he was
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.; see Halbrook, supra note 29, at 658, 671; see also 1879 TEX. PENAL
CODE 318-23.
37 42 Tex. 455 (1874).
38 id.
39 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
40 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
41 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
42 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
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sitting on his bench mending a shoe when he heard the click of a
pistol and someone walking on the sidewalk.43 Miller looked up
and saw two officers standing side by side within two feet of
him." Without explanation, they each fired one shot, which
missed Miller and struck the wall.45 Miller reached under his
bench, grabbed his Colt .45, and returned fire.46 One officer ran
across the street and continued shooting at Miller, and the other
officer fell.4 7
Miller's account of the shooting seems implausible. For safety
reasons, well-trained officers would not have stood side by side
within two feet of a subject they considered to be armed and
potentially dangerous. The stance would have left them vulnerable
to an act of violence by Miller, and it would not have provided
them with the necessary cover and concealment. If Miller is to be
believed, one would have to accept the proposition that the officers,
who were standing two feet away from him with their weapons in
their outstretched arms, missed their target from less than one foot
away. Additionally, the officers' positions would have jeopardized
any benefit of a surprise attack. On the other hand, it is possible
that the officers were incompetent shooters, poorly trained, and did
not know elementary rules concerning how to approach an armed
suspect.
2. Mattie Anderson's Version
Mattie Anderson, Miller's live-in maid, related another version
of the story to the same reporter who interviewed Miller.
4 8
Anderson stated that she was in the middle room of the building
4 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
4A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
45 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
46 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1. See generally Stevenson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 313, 321-23 (1896) (restating the common law rule that law
enforcement's excessive use of deadly force can be resisted by an innocent party
and that innocent party may use deadly force, if necessary).
" A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
48 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
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when she heard the first shot.49 She ran into the kitchen and asked
Miller what was happening." He responded: "These d-n police-
men are bothering me" and went to his safe to retrieve more
cartridges.5 Possibly realizing that Anderson was scared for
herself and her daughter, Miller told her to leave, and she escaped
through a window.5
2
3. The School Principal's Version
W.R. Miller, principal of a nearby public school, also witnessed
the shooting and offered a different account.53 The principal stated
that as the two police officers were walking by the shop, Franklin
Miller stepped into the doorway with a large pistol in his hand and
fired one shot in Officer Riddle's direction which missed.54
Officer Early turned and attempted to draw his weapon, but
stumbled to the ground.55 Miller then shot and killed Riddle
before Early could obtain cover behind the corner of a building and
return fire.56
The principal's story seems dubious for one reason: If Miller
attacked the officers without warning as they were walking outside
his business preparing to serve Miller with the affidavit, Officer
Early certainly would have recounted this more sympathetic version
of events.
4. The Police Version
According to Officer Early, Officer Riddle and he wanted to
execute a cautious approach as they neared the building because
they considered Miller a dangerous subject.57 Thus, they walked
"9 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
50 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
51 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
52 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
3 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
5' A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
" A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
56 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
" A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
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on the dark side of the street, and they converged on the door with
Early brandishing his six-shooter and Riddle behind him holding a
club.58 As they stood in front of the door, Miller drew one of his
pistols from under his bench and fired two shots at Officer Early,
who stumbled backward and fell on the sidewalk.59 Miller then
opened fire on Officer Riddle, striking him once above the left eye
and once through the left arm.60 Officer Early unsuccessfully
returned fire at Miller, who had concealed himself inside the
building. 61 Officer Early explained that he could not have dis-
charged his weapon when Miller reached for his firearm because
he did not "have a self-acting pistol. ' 62
E. The Attempted Lynching After the Shoot-out
The witnesses do not disagree on what transpired after Officer
Riddle was shot. Once Miller and Officer Early ceased firing,
Miller retreated to the center of the room, "swearing that he would
kill anybody who approached him., 63 A large crowd had begun
to form and although some of them were armed, Miller kept them
at bay with his pistol.64 Two men in the crowd walked across the
street, picked up Officer Riddle, and took him to a house where he
58 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
59 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
60 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
61 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
62 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1. Officer Early's reference to a "self-
acting" pistol evidently meant a double-action revolver, which could be fired
simply by pulling the trigger. At that time, most handguns were probably single-
action revolvers, which must first be cocked by pulling the hammer back and
then may be discharged by pulling the trigger. Colt marketed its first double-
action revolver in 1877, calling it the New Double Action Self-Cocking Central
Fire Six Shot Revolver. CHARLES T. HAVEN & FRANK A. BELDEN, A HISTORY
OF THE COLT REVOLVER 162 (1940). It was later named the Lightning Model.
Id. Smith & Wesson marketed its first double-action revolver, the .38 Double
Action First Model, in 1880. RoY G. JINKS, HISTORY OF SMITH & WESSON 124-
25 (Reinfeld Publ'g Inc. 1977). Semi-automatic ("self-loading") pistols would
not come onto the scene until early in the twentieth century. Id. at 234-37.
63 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
64 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
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died about a half an hour later.65 The crowd reached mob propor-
tions of at least 160 people, and cries of "lynch him" and "burn
him out" could be heard. 66 Miller may have acquired a negative
reputation with the populace due to his relationship with a black
woman, his slaying of Officer Riddle, or both. The true origin of
this animosity is unknown.
Assistant Chief of Police Cornwell tried to negotiate Miller's
surrender.67 Miller was afraid that if he did surrender, the impas-
sioned mob would kill him.68 After some discussion, Cornwell
walked around to the back of the house, kicked in the door, and
called to Miller to give himself up or be shot.69 Miller handed
Cornwell his pistol, and Officer Alexander dragged Miller
outside.7 °
Over a dozen officers had the responsibility of safely placing
Miller in the patrol wagon without interference from the angry
throng who continued to yell, "mob him, hang him, hang him."7
As the police were attempting to lift Miller into the wagon, a man
65 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
66 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1. Lynchings were not reserved only for
blacks. Whites were also the victims of this extra-legal death penalty. Between
1882-1951 in Texas, there were one-hundred and forty-one whites lynched
compared to three-hundred and fifty-two blacks. RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES 57 (Allen D. Grimshaw ed., 1969). In 1892 in Texas, sixty-nine
whites and one-hundred and sixty-one blacks were lynched. Id. at 58. The
principle cause of lynchings nationwide during the period 1882-1951 was
homicide. Id. at 59. Being charged with any crime, however, does not necessarily
mean that the person lynched was guilty of that crime.
67 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
68 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1. Miller's fear of the growing mob was
quite understandable. As Milton Konvitz explains, "Since legal processes were
often slow and unsatisfactory, . .. to provide swifter and more effective
punishment, the South turned to the device of the citizen-mob, long known on
the frontier as lynch law." MILTON R. KONvITz, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW 6-7 (1961) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally JAMES ELBERT
CUTLER, LYNCH-LAW: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE HISTORY OF LYNCHING IN
THE UNITED STATES (1905) (surveying the origins, history and practice of lynch-
law in the United States).
69 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
70 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
7' A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
threw a noose around Miller's neck and passed the rope to a boy
on a horse. 72 The boy wrapped the rope around the pommel of his
saddle, whipped his horse, and the horse dragged Miller away from
the officers and brought him down on his head.73 Fortunately for
Miller, however, the crowd was so dense that the animal could not
move forward and the rope became unhitched from the saddle.74
As Miller lay on the ground semi-conscious from the attempted
strangulation, another member of the crowd struck Miller on the
back of the head with a shotgun and tried to hit Miller a second
time before the officers threw Miller into the wagon.75 The police
drove the wagon through the crowd, but they continued to
encounter hostile townspeople en route to the jail.76 A bystander
jumped into the moving wagon and tossed a rope around Miller's
neck.7 7 An officer managed to remove the rope before the man
could jump off the wagon with Miller in tOw. 78 When the officers
finally arrived at the jail with Miller, someone unsuccessfully tried
to shoot Miller as the heavy iron doors to the jail were closing.79
Although Miller had killed a police officer, he owed his life to the
law enforcement officers who had the difficult job of protecting
him from the mob.8 °
The relentless crowd gathered in front of the jail while speech-
makers opined about the "higher law that society owed itself where
72 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
73 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
7' A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
75 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
76 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
77 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
78 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
'9 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
80 RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 66, at 59.
The vigilance of law enforcement officials and the intelligent action of
members of private citizens have kept many intended victims from
being put to death. Were precautions not taken to save accused persons
from mob law, such as augmenting guards, removing the prisoner to
a place of safekeeping, using force to disperse the mob, or some other
stratagem, the annual lynching record would contain more names than
are now listed.
RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 66, at 59.
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statutory law did not prove effective in practice."81 Later in the
day, circulars announcing a mass meeting at City Hall at 5:30, at
"which all law-abiding citizens were required to be present," were
distributed throughout the city.82 Three hundred men gathered in
an auditorium and listened as a gentleman named Ford House gave
the opening remarks, stating that the purpose of the meeting was
to call all law-abiding citizens together "to protect against the
murders, protect themselves and [to] avenge the deaths of the offi-
cers." 83 The crowd of three hundred men cheered as House stated
that "we must get those men in jail, even if some of us have to die
for it. Now men, no boys, I want volunteers to go and get the
cannon. Who will go with me?"84 Mayor Connor and Chief of
Police Jim Arnold addressed the crowd and attempted to dissuade
them from taking the law into their own hands.85 After one man
in the auditorium interrupted the Mayor by shouting that officers
were moving Miller from the jail, the crowd left the hall and
stormed the jail screaming, "lynch him" and "hang him."86
Mayor Connor, Chief of Police Arnold, Sheriff Lewis, a couple
of judges, and over fifty officers blocked the mob from entering the
"' A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1. The crowd continued to be inflamma-
tory and violent. During these addresses, a small man with a "strong foreign
accent" yelled, "I'll furnish a small cannon to blow down the tam shale." A
Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
82 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
8' A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1. Another Dallas police officer, Officer
Brewer, had been killed three weeks earlier by Henry Miller, an unrelated
assailant. A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 2.
8 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1. After the cheering by the crowd had
ceased, the following resolution was adopted:
Resolved by the citizens of Dallas, that we condemn in unmeasured
terms the lawlessness and the impunity with which a man's life can
and has been taken, and we feel that the law, as now administered, is
a farce and affords no relief and that it is further the sense of those
assembled that we are compelled, for our own safety and that of our
citizens, to take the law in our own hands.
A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 2.
85 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 2.
86 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
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jail and exclaimed that they would protect Miller to the death.87
After several heated exchanges between the leaders of the crowd
and Miller's protectors, a heavy rain began to fall, which caused
the townspeople to disperse.88 Regarding the attack on the jail,
Miller told a reporter "that it was all uncalled for ... I knew I
would be protected by the sheriff. When the people hear both sides
I think I will get justice., 89 The Grand Jury returned a bill of
indictment against Miller the same day.9'
F Miller's Murder Trial
Jury selection in Franklin Miller's murder trial was completed
a month later on July 20, 1892, before Judge Charles Fred
Tucker.9' The state's first witness was officer T.J. Early who had
accompanied Officer Riddle to serve the affidavit on Miller.92
Early's testimony was consistent with the statement he gave the
day of the shooting. He testified that as he stepped into Miller's
doorway, he saw Miller grab a pistol.93 Early saw a flash, fell to
" A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1. Judges Tucker and Burke who stood
with the Mayor, Sheriff, and Chief of Police in front of the jail, were assaulted
by Ford House as they walked toward the jail for the purpose of protecting
Miller. A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
88 A Fearful Deed, supra note 9, at 1.
89 The Attack on the Jail, DAL. MORN. NEWS, June 19, 1892, at 12; see also
The Attack on the Jail, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, June 20, 1892, at 6.
'0 The Attack on the Jail, DAL. MORN. NEWS, June 19, 1892, at 12.
9' The Trial of P.F. Miller, DAL. MORN. NEWS, July 21, 1892, at 8.
[hereinafter DAL. MORN. NEWS]. Miller's demeanor during the trial was
described as follows: "Miller throughout the trial evidenced the keenest interest
in the proceedings. His ears caught every word that fell from the lips of the
witnesses and at moments he showed symptoms of irritation . . . Miller does not
smile at anybody and his looks are serious." The Trial of P.F. Miller, GALVES-
TON DAILY NEWS, July 23, 1892, at 6 [hereinafter GALVESTON DAILY NEWS].
92 DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8. Officer Early must have left the
police force after the shooting death of his partner, because the news articles
refer to him as "ex-policeman." DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8.
93 DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8.
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the ground and saw Miller shooting at him.94 Early fired his pistol
twice in Miller's direction.95
George Miller, a saloon keeper, testified next for the state.96
Miller testified that on the night before the shooting, Franklin
Miller was walking along the street with a black baby in one arm
and his pistol in his other hand.97 He was looking for Riddle and
threatening to kill the officers and then himself.98 George Miller
stated that approximately ten minutes prior to the shooting, he saw
Officer Riddle in front of his saloon.99 George Miller told Riddle
and Early about the defendant's threats the previous evening.'°°
Regarding the shooting, the witness stated that he was standing
about fifty feet behind Officer Riddle when Riddle was shot.' °1
The first shot was fired from inside the defendant's house, and
caused Officer Early to stumble backward.'0 2
Several other people testified as witnesses to the shooting. Fred
Flora, a twelve-year-old black child testified that on the night
before the shooting, he heard Miller say that he was going to kill
"that grayheaded Riddle or any other son of an etc. that stopped
him."' 3 Similarly, Earl Roberts, a wood dealer, testified that he
also heard the threat the night before the shooting and added that
Miller had stated that the policemen had bothered him so much that
94 DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8.
95 DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8.
96 DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8.
97 DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8.
98 DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8. It is unclear from the newspaper
articles if George Miller identified the wrong officer as target of Franklin
Miller's search. If Franklin Miller was angry at any officers, it would stand to
reason that he would not have been looking for Officer Riddle, but, instead,
Officers Lamar and Estelle who arrested him as a result of his relationship with
Mattie Anderson. If Franklin Miller did intend to threaten Officer Riddle, the
reason for the menacing remark is indeterminate.
99 DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8.
100 DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8.
101 DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8.
102 DAL. MORN. NEWS, supra note 91, at 8.
"' GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, supra note 91, at 6.
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"he was crazy."' ' Two other witnesses stated that they observed
Miller shoot Riddle as he lay on the ground.' °5
After the state rested its case, the defense recalled Earl Roberts
to the stand, to testify that Officer Riddle was extending his arm to
fire when he was shot.' 6 Defense witness Van Corkham testified
to finding bullet holes inside Miller's house, which would bolster
Miller's claim of self-defense."°7 Tom Duffy, another defense
witness, testified that after Miller was arrested, Officer Riddle's
weapon showed signs of having been recently fired. 0 8
On July 23, 1892, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of
murder in the first degree' °9 against Miller and sentenced him to
death.10 The jury rejected Miller's defense of justifiable homi-
104 GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, supra note 91, at 6.
105 GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, supra note 91, at 6. Other state's witnesses
testified as follows: Dr. D.L. Thompson testified as to Riddle's injuries.
GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, supra note 91, at 6. W. Dresser testified that Riddle
was shot and while a liquid was being poured into him, Miller said, "They can
pour it down him, but I will get another son of an etc. before they get me."
GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, supra note 91, at 6. Officer H.C. Lamar testified that
the evening before Riddle was killed he told the witnesses that he was going to
arrest the defendant for carrying a pistol. GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, supra note
91, at 6. Assistant Chief of Police Comwell testified to the arrest of Miller and
to the finding of two pistols and two boxes of cartridges. Id. Tom Wilson
testified that Riddle did not fire a shot. GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, supra note 91,
at 6.
106 GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, supra note 91, at 6.
107 GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, supra note 91, at 6.
108 GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, supra note 91, at 6.
'09 1879 TEX. PENAL CODE 605 (defining a first degree murderer as "[e]very
person with a sound memory and discretion who shall unlawfully kill any
reasonable creature in being within this state with malice aforethought, either
express or implied").
11o Death Penalty Assessed, DAL. MORN. NEWS, July 24, 1892, at 12.
Miller's reaction to the verdict was described as follows:
Not a muscle moved in Miller's face. He fixed his gaze on the clerk,
braced himself up in his chair and bent forward to catch every word.
His piercing eyes, which are a mixture of blue and gray, one opened
a little wider than the other, did not move, and when at the conclusion
the clerk's voice rang out clear and distinct and assess his punishment
at death Miller was perfectly calm. He seemed to accept it philosophi-
cally, and after a moment's reflection he reached for the glass and
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cide,"' and they refused to find him guilty of the lesser offenses
of second degree murder and manslaughter that had been included
in the indictment."
12
G. Miller's Appeal
Miller appealed his case to the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas, which upheld his conviction on January 21, 1893.' 3 On
July 17, 1893, Judge Tucker sentenced Miller to death and fixed
August 18, 1893 as the date of execution. 1 4 When Judge Tucker
asked Miller if he had any reason why the death sentence should
not be imposed, Miller replied that he was not given a fair trial and
that he killed Officer Riddle in self-defense after the officers fired
pitcher on the table in front of him and took a drink of water.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
.. Concerning justifiable homicide, Judge Tucker charged the jury as
follows:
If you believe from the evidence that the defendant did kill the
deceased, Riddle, as charged in the indictment, but should further
believe from the evidence that at the time defendant took up his pistol
and fired the first shot fired by him, the deceased Riddle, or the
policeman, Early, was attempting to use upon him a deadly weapon,
or by some act done by said Riddle or Early at the time reasonably
indicated to the defendant, and created in the mind of the defendant a
reasonable expectation or fear that they were or either of them was
about to make an unlawful attack upon the defendant with a weapon
calculated to produce death or serious bodily injury, then it would be
presumed from such act that they intended to make use of such
weapon to kill the defendant, or to inflict serious bodily injury upon
him, and you will in such case acquit the defendant as having acted in
his lawful self-defense.
Id.; see 1879 TEx. PENAL CODE 552-575.
112 Death Penalty Assessed, DAL. MORNING NEWS, July 24, 1892, at 12.
" Miller v. State, 20 S.W. 1103 (1893). Miller was interviewed by a
reporter on January 21, 1893. He told the reporter that he did not expect the
Appellate Court to rule in his favor and he was prepared to die. Miller's Death
Watch, DAL. MORNING NEWS, Jan. 22, 1863, at 2. Miller was housed in the
"doomed man's cell" in the jail and he was placed under a death watch. Id.
114 The Sentence of Death, DAL. MORN. NEWS, July 18, 1893, at 8.
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at him. 115 Miller's appeal to Texas Governor Hogg to commute
his sentence was rejected on August 14, 1893.116
Miller took his case to the Supreme Court, and lost unanimous-
ly. 117 After Miller lost his Supreme Court appeal, his conviction
was affirmed on May 9, 1895 and he was sentenced to death on
May 16, 1895.18 On July 8, 1895, Governor C.A. Culberson
commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment." 9 After
serving sixteen years in the penitentiary, Miller was pardoned by
Governor T.M. Campbell on December 14, 1908.120
II. THE STATE OF SECOND AMENDMENT AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE IN THE SUPREME COURT PRIOR TO
MILLER V. TEXAS
A. United States v. Cruikshank
Following the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court heard two major cases involving the applicability
of the Second Amendment to the states. In United States v.
Cruikshank, a rioting band of whites burned down a Louisiana
courthouse occupied by group of armed blacks (following the
disputed 1872 elections).'2 ' William Cruikshank and a handful of
whites who allegedly participated were prosecuted under the federal
Enforcement Act, which made it unlawful for private citizens to
115 Id. Miller was interviewed again six days before his scheduled date of
execution. When asked if he felt resigned to his fate, Miller responded, "Yes, We
should resign ourselves to the inevitable; though of course, a man hates to die
on the gallows." Franklin P. Miller, DAL. MoRN. NEWS, Aug. 13, 1893, at 16.
116 Franklin P. Miller's Case, DAL. MoRN. NEWS, Aug.15, 1893, at 8.
See infra Part IV (discussing Miller's case before the Supreme Court).
118 Convict Record Ledger Data, supra note 8.
119 Convict Record Ledger Data, supra note 8.
120 Convict Record Ledger Data, supra note 8.
121 92 U.S. 542 (1876). Competing Republican and Democratic factions
claimed to have won the offices of judge and sheriff in Grant Parish, Louisiana,
in the chaotic elections of 1872. See S. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: 1866-1876, 159 (1998).
In March 1873, a Republican faction, led by black militia officer William Ward,
seized the courthouse in Colfax, the parish seat. Id.
756
SECOND AMENDMENT
deprive others of their constitutional rights.122 Cruikshank was
convicted of conspiring to deprive the blacks of the rights they had
been granted by the Constitution, including the right peaceably to
assemble and the right to bear arms. 123
The Supreme Court held the Enforcement Act unconstitution-
al.124 According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment did
give Congress the power to prevent interference with rights granted
by the Constitution. 125 The Court maintained, however, that the
right to assemble and the right to arms were not rights granted or
created by the Constitution, because they were fundamental human
rights that pre-existed the Constitution. 26
Subsequently, the Supreme Court itself and lower courts as well
have been unable to establish a settled position for what Cruik-
shank means. Cruikshank involved private citizens harming other
122 Enforcement Act, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
123 GEORGE C. RABLE, BuT THERE WAS No PEACE: THE ROLE OF
VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 125-29 (1984).
124 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
125 Id. at 551-53.
126 Id. The Court explained:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes
existed long before the adoption of the Constitution of the United
States. In fact, it is, and always has been, one of the attributes of
citizenship under a free government. It "derives its source," to use the
language of Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.
211, "from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by civilized
man throughout the world." It is found wherever civilization exists. It
was not, therefore, a right granted to the people by the Constitution.
The government of the United States when established found it in
existence, with the obligation on the part of the States to afford it
protection ....
The right ... of bearing arms for a lawful purpose ... is not a right
granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent on
that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that
it shall not be infringed; but this.., means no more than it shall not
be infringed by Congress ... leaving the people to look for their
protection against any violation by their fellow citizens of the rights it
recognizes, to what is called ... the powers which relate to merely
municipal legislation.
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private citizens - so the most direct reading of Cruikshank is that
there cannot be a Fourteenth Amendment violation unless there is
state action.127 A second implication of Cruikshank, given the
case's language that the Second Amendment simply protects the
right to arms from federal infringement, would be cited in dicta in
later cases as supporting the theory that the Second Amendment
and the rest of Bill of Rights are not directly enforceable against
the states. 128 A third interpretation was offered by some twentieth
century Supreme Court opinions: such cases cite Cruikshank to
mean that the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the
Second Amendment.
29
B. Presser v. Illinois
Another case that involved the interplay of the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments and generated disagreement among later
courts is Presser v. Illinois. 30 The case arose out of a state law
banning armed parades in public. The purpose of the law was to
suppress demonstrations by labor organizations, which wanted to
show that they could resist company goons and the like.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Illinois parade ban.
First, the Court held that the Illinois ban on armed parades did "not
infringe the right of the people to keep and bear arms."'' This
holding is consistent with traditional common law boundaries on
the right to arms, which prohibited terrifyingly large assemblies of
127 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 286-88 (1892) (holding that the
First Amendment right to assembly and the Second Amendment right to arms are
similar, and that the Bill of Rights protects neither against private interference).
128 Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1890) (stating that the Second Amend-
ment and other Bill of Rights protections are not directly applicable to states);
Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31 (1890) (same).
129 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357
U.S. 371 (1958).
130 116 U.S. 252 (1886). See generally S. Halbrook, The Right of Workers
to Assemble and to Bear Arms: Presser v. Illinois, One of the Last Holdouts
Against Application of the Bill of Rights to the States, 76 U. DET. MERCY L.
REv. 943 (1999).
131 Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
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armed men. 13 2 Furthermore, the Court noted that the Second
Amendment by its own force "is a limitation only upon the power
of Congress and the National Government, and not upon that of the
States."' 133 Thus far, Presser was consistent with the most straigh-
tforward reading of Cruikshank.
Did some other part of the Constitution make the Second
Amendment enforceable against the states? The Court added that
the Illinois law did not appear to interfere with any of the "privi-
leges or immunities" of citizens of the United States, although the
Court never used the words "Fourteenth Amendment."
134
If we presume that the Court meant "Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and Immunities," then Presser is consistent with all the
other Fourteenth Amendment cases from the Supreme Court in the
1870s and 1880s, which consistently rejected the proposition that
any part of the Bill of Rights is among the "Privileges and
Immunities" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 35
Could the Second Amendment - or any other part of the Bill
of Rights - be protected from state and local infringement by
another part of the Fourteenth Amendment such as Due Process
clause? The Presser Court had nothing to say on the subject, since
Due Process incorporation did not yet exist as a legal theory. Not
until eleven years after Presser was decided did the theory of Due
Process incorporation arise in the Supreme Court, when the Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause incorpo-
rated the right to compensation for property taken by the state, as
guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment. 136
In the twentieth century, Presser was cited by Justice Brennan
for the proposition that the Second Amendment was not one of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities. 137 Presser
132 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 126
(Garland Publ'g 1978) (1716) (observing that a Justice of the Peace may require
surety from persons who "go about with unusual Weapons or Attendants, to the
Terror of the People").
' Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
'34 Id. at 266.
135 Id.
136 Chicago B.& Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
'7 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1964).
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was also listed among a series of cases which, according to Justice
Black, had merely hinted, but never explicitly stated, that particular
Bill of Rights provisions were not Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and Immunities. 3 8
In 1908, the Court in Twining v. New Jersey refused to make
the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination guarantee applicable to
state criminal trials via the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 9 Twining
did explicitly state, however, that Presser held that the Second
Amendment was not a Fourteenth Amendment Privilege or
Immunity. 140 Additionally, Maxwell v. Dow, an 1899 case also
involving the Fourteenth Amendment, had interpreted Presser to
mean that the Second Amendment did not, by itself, directly apply
to the states.14'
Presser's meaning has been interpreted differently by the
courts, and determining the outer reaches of the case is difficult.
Yet in cases decided in the 1980s and 1990s, federal courts have
been asked to rule on whether the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process clause makes the Second Amendment enforceable against
the states. 42 These courts claim that Presser is binding precedent
on this issue, so that a modem court may not even consider the
matter. 143 However, given that Presser had never even addressed
the then-unknown issue of Due Process incorporation, modem
courts are hiding behind a mischaracterization of Presser, rather
than legitimately relying on Presser as a controlling precedent.
' Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70-71 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
139 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled by Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
140 Id. at 98-99.
141 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 597 (1899).
142 See, e.g., Fresno Rifle Club v. Van de Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 730 (9th Cir.
1992) ("Therefore, there is no reason to believe that Miller left open the
incorporation question any more than Cruikshank or Presser."); Quilici v. Vill.
of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding handgun
ban); see also Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522 (6th
Cir. 1998) (invalidating city's "assault weapon" ban as vague and violative of
equal protection, but stating in dictum that Presser held that the Second
Amendment did not apply to the states).
143 See id.
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This is where Miller v. Texas comes in.'44 Miller was the first
Supreme Court case after Presser to address the Second/Fourteenth
Amendment issue. The case provides guidance as to what Presser
and Cruikshank meant to the Supreme Court near the end of the
nineteenth century. 145
III. MILLER V. TEXAS IN THE SUPREME COURT
Although Franklin Miller's troubles had grown out of his inter-
racial relationship with a black woman, the attempted arrest was for
violating a weapons law: Texas's 1871 Reconstruction Act.
146
The Act prohibited the carrying of pistols and knives and allowed
a warrantless arrest for alleged violations.
147
Miller's murder conviction was affirmed by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals on January 21, 1893.148 Miller petitioned for a
rehearing, raising for the first time the claim that the Reconstruc-
tion Act of 1871 violated the Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. 149 The case then went to the Supreme Court and
Miller lost on every issue. 150 Despite the law against carrying
144 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
141 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1876).
146 An Act to Regulate the Keeping and Bearing of Deadly Weapons, Law
of April 12, 1871, ch. 34, § 1, 1871 TEX. GEN. LAWs 25.
147 Id. The Reconstruction Act of 1871 was not substantially modified until
1995, when the legislature passed, and Governor George W. Bush, IV, signed,
a law establishing a uniform and objective system for the issuance of concealed
handgun permits to adults who pass a background check and a safety class. See
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 411.171, et seq. (Vernon 1998).
148 Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894).
149 See infra Part II.G.; see also Miller, 153 U.S. at 538.
150 Id. at 535-36. The Court's syllabus summarized the defendant's
arguments as follows:
That the statute of the state of Texas prohibiting the carrying of
dangerous weapons on the person, by authority of which statute the
court charged the jury that, if defendant was on a public street carrying
a pistol, he was violating the law, infringed the right of the defendant
as a citizen of the United States, and was in conflict with the 2d
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, providing that the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed;
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pistols and its mandatory arrest provision, the Court held that the
record did not reflect that Miller had been denied his rights under
the Second or Fourth Amendments. The Court explained:
In his motion for a rehearing, however, defendant claimed
that the law of the State of Texas forbidding the carrying
of weapons, and authorizing the arrest without warrant of
any person violating such law, under which certain
questions arose upon the trial of the case, was in conflict
with the Second and Fourth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, one of which provides that the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed, and the other of which protects the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures. We have
examined the record in vain, however, to find where the
defendant was denied the benefit of any of these provi-
sions. 5"'
The excerpt above is indicative of the Court's Bill of Rights
jurisprudence at the end of the nineteenth century. 5 2 The Court
held that a ban on concealed weapons was one of the exceptions
implicit in the Bill of Rights - similar to the implicit exception in
the First Amendment to allow a ban on blasphemy, libel, or
indecency. 153
second, that the same statute, which provided that any person carrying
arms in violation of the previous section, might be arrested without
warrant, under which the court charged the jury that defendant, if he
were carrying arms in violation of the statute, was subject to arrest
without warrant, was in contravention of the 4th Amendment of the
Constitution, which provides that the right of the people to be secure
in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated and of the 5th and 14th amendments, which provide that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, and that no state shall pass or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges of or immunities of citizens of the United
States.
Id.
151 Miller, 153 U.S. at 538.
152 See, e.g., Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
113 See id. at 281. Justice Brown, writing for the Court, elaborated as
follows:
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The Miller Court then addressed the question of whether the
Second or Fourth Amendments were even applicable to Texas law:
"[A]nd even if he were [denied the benefit of the Second and
Fourth Amendments], it is well settled that the restrictions of these
amendments operate only upon the Federal power, and have no
reference whatever to proceedings in state courts."
' 15 4
This part of the opinion follows the straightforward interpreta-
tion of the holding in Presser and the dicta in Cruikshank - that
the Second Amendment by its own terms only restricts the federal
government. 155
The Supreme Court then turned to the claim that the Texas
statute violated the Second and Fourth Amendments as incorporat-
ed in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court refused to address the
claim as it was not made in a timely fashion:
And if the Fourteenth Amendment limited the power of the
States as to such rights, as pertaining to citizens of the
United States, we think it was fatal to this claim that it
was not set up in the trial court . .. A privilege or
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten Amendments to the
constitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended
to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody
certain guarantees and immunities which we had inherited from our
English ancestors, and which from time immemorial had been subject
to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the
case. In incorporating these principles into the fundamental law, there
was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be
recognized as if they had been formally expressed. Thus, the freedom
of speech and of the press (article 1) does not permit the publication
of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications
injurious to public morals or private reputation; the right of the people
to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not infringed by law prohibiting the
carrying of concealed weapons; the provision that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy (art. 5) does not prevent a second trial, if upon
the first trial the jury failed to agree, or the verdict was set aside upon
the defendant's motion.
Id. at 281-82.
114 Miller, 153 U.S. at 538 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876)).
155 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1876).
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immunity under the Constitution of the United States
cannot be set up here... when suggested for the first time
in a petition for rehearing after judgment. 5 6
Rather than reject a Privileges and Immunities incorporation of
the Second and Fourth amendments into the Fourteenth, the
Supreme Court simply refused to decide the defendant's claim
because the Court's powers of adjudication were limited to the
review of errors timely objected to in the trial court. This is a
rather odd way to proceed if the issue had really been settled by
Presser in 1886. It bears emphasis that the Miller Court did not
deem the issue well settled. This stands in stark contrast to what
some modern courts assume.'57 Miller treated the question as
open, but not presently appropriate for the Court to decide. Further-
more, in 1899, the Court, in Maxwell v. Dow, described Presser as
only bearing on direct application of the Second Amendment to the
states rather than as deciding the issue of Privileges and Immunities
incorporation. 15 8
So where does this leave us today? Miller v. Texas suggests
that the Supreme Court of the 1890s did not view Presser or
Cruikshank as foreclosing the possibility that the Second Amend-
ment might apply to the states as a Fourteenth Amendment
Privilege or Immunity.'59 The issue of incorporation via the Due
Process clause was not even addressed, much less disposed of. At
the dawn of the twenty-first century, Miller v. Texas teaches us that
156 Miller, 153 U.S. at 538-39. The court added that there "was no denial of
[procedural] due process of law, nor did the law of the State, to which reference
was made, abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States"
Id. (emphasis in original). The same year it ruled that the mere fact that a person
carried a gun could not be used a proof of homicidal intent, "provided he
rightfully so armed himself for purposes simply of self-defense." Gourko v.
United States, 153 U.S. 183, 191 (1894). For the late nineteenth-century Court's
protective view toward armed self-defense, see David B. Kopel, The Self Defense
Cases: How the Supreme Court Confronted a Hanging Judge in the Nineteenth
Century, and Some Tough Lessons for Jurisprudence in the Twenty-First, 27 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 293 (2000).
,57 See supra note 142.
158 176 U.S. 581, 597-98 (1899).
159 Miller, 153 U.S. at 536; Presser, 116 U.S. at 253; Cruikshank, 116 U.S.
at 253.
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the legal history of the nineteenth century does not deprive us of
the freedom to decide the issue. There are no binding precedents
to limit our choices.
CONCLUSION
What really happened during that fatal confrontation between
Franklin Miller and the Dallas Police? We will never know for
sure. However, the Miller case reminds us that some principles of
criminal justice, and human nature, are still very relevant today:
that people who cross certain social boundaries - including racial
lines - may be singled out for government harassment; that in
confrontations between the police and social outcasts, juries tend
to believe the police, even when the evidence is not necessarily
clear; that the killing of a police officer, even in possible self-
defense, tends to arouse the worst passions of the community. 6 '
The Miller case has been discussed in law review articles, and
has appeared in briefs filed with the Supreme Court, from the
1930s to the present.' 61 This article, however, was the first to
discover that Franklin Miller was not executed, even after he had
lost in the Supreme Court. Although Miller was a convicted cop-
killer who had exhausted all his appeals, the Governor of Texas
spared his life. Perhaps the Governor studied the issues surrounding
the case carefully enough to recognize that there were serious
questions about whether Miller was the aggressor or the victim and
whether he was unfairly targeted by the police. Today, when
executive pardons are fodder for political attacks, and when the
death penalty is becoming more frequent (especially in Texas),
Miller v. Texas reminds us that an essential component of a truly
fair system of criminal justice is an executive who has the courage
and the insight to use his power of clemency. As a matter of law,
'60 Miller, 153 U.S. at 538.
161 See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 53, 61 n. 19 (1992); David E. Murley, Private Enforcement of the Social
Contract: Deshaney and the Second Amendment Right to Own Firearms, 36
DUQ. L.REv. 827, 842 (1998); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining:
Reassessing the Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457,
1500 (2000).
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Miller stresses our freedom of choice about firearms policy. The
incorporation of the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment is still an open issue, not one for which our choices
have been controlled.
